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If a man does not keep pace with his companions, perhaps it is
because he hears a different drummer. Let him step to the music
which he hears, however measured or far away.
Henry David Thoreau
It is a wise man who said that there is no greater inequality than the
equal treatment of unequals.
Justice Felix Frankfurter'
I. INTRODUCTION
By the spring of 1864, the great armies of the Union and the
Confederacy had maneuvered themselves into the Commonwealth of
Virginia for one final year of war. The days of the Confederacy
appeared to be numbered. Fighting from the previous summer ended
with Union victories at Gettysburg in the North and at Vicksburg in
the South. With the war in the western states won and Robert E.
Lee's Army of Northern Virginia out of Pennsylvania, President Lin-
1. HENRY D. THOREAU, WALDEN 18 (1854).
2. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 184 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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coin concentrated on bringing a speedy end to three years of division
and carnage. Lincoln promoted Ulysses S. Grant to the rank of Gen-
eral-in-Chief of all Union forces, and Grant responded swiftly by
designing a plan to trap Lee in Virginia. Like carving a turkey, the
strategy, according to Lincoln, entailed Grant's main army doing all
the "skinning" while two auxiliary Northern armies would each
"hold a leg."' 3 As part of the plan, Grant ordered one of his leg-hold-
ers, General Franz Sigel, to move his forces south through the Shen-
andoah Valley, with the goal of severing Lee's communications and
supplies from the region west of the main Confederate army.
Loyal to the Confederacy and eager for battle, young cadets at
the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in Lexington, Virginia, anx-
iously awaited the opportunity to put their school on the map and
their fighting spirit into southern folklore. The approaching Union
army kindled the cadets' dreams of battlefield heroics.
Sigel and his Union army met little opposition as they moved
through the Valley. However, when the army arrived at New Market,
Sigel's advance guard ran into Confederate forces led by General John
C. Breckinridge.4 Breckinridge managed to muster a small force from
the valley and mountains surrounding the Shenandoah to repel the
invading Union troops. Still heavily outnumbered, the Confederate
General had no choice but to summon the young boys of VMI.
On a spring day in May, 247 VMI cadets, dressed in their grey
parade-ground uniforms, set out from their barracks and marched
north across the rolling hills of western Virginia to meet up with
Breckinridge's Confederate forces at New Market. The fourteen to
seventeen year old cadets arrived in time to face Union batteries
assembled on a knoll overlooking the Confederate line. Although
ordered only to act as reserves, the VMI cadets found themselves in
the forefront of the battle when the first Confederate lines broke and
retreated to the rear. Closing the gap caused by the retreat, the VMI
cadets, facing a heavy cannonade, marched forward and positioned
themselves behind a fence. The cadets waited as skies darkened with
threatening storm clouds and cannon fire competed with loud bursts
of thunder.
The events that follow have been described by historians as "one
of the most remarkable episodes of the Civil War, or indeed, of any
war. ' After all attempts to defeat the batteries failed, the "boy
3. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 722 (1988).
4. ALLAN NEVINS, THE WAR FOR THE UNION 51 (1971).
5. EDWARD R. TURNER, THE NEW MARKET CAMPAIGN 66 (1912) ("What they did
was so brilliant, so unusual, and so unexpected, that after a while their exploits came to be
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soldiers" of VMI, years younger than Breckinridge's veterans, rose as
one man. They climbed the fences and, with precision, quick-stepped
across the slope into the muzzles of Union guns. The young cadets'
courage generated so much enthusiasm in the adjacent commands
that the whole Confederate line rushed forward.6 Unable to distin-
guish the sounds of thunder and artillery, the cadets charged on, can-
non fire pouring into their ranks, until they reached the Union guns
on the hilltop. Shaken by the charge, the Union troops fell back as
the VMI soldiers stormed the position.
The charge at New Market immortalized the cadets and won
VMI great fame. Of the 247 cadets, more than fifty had been shot and
no less than ten lost their lives. The VMI charge temporarily stymied
the Union invasion of the Shenandoah, and as a result Lincoln was
forced to replace General Sigel.
Established in 1839, VMI is the nation's first state-supported mil-
itary college. The school originally served as an arsenal for storage of
spare arms and munitions left with Virginia after the War of 1812. 7
Tradition is the cornerstone of this 154-year-old establishment.
Before New Market and the Civil War, Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson
was a professor at VMI. Cadets today must still give a morning salute
to the bronze statue of Stonewall that stands in the heart of the cam-
pus. Of the 1,902 men that attended VMI until 1861, 1,781 fought for
the Confederacy. VMI composed one-third of the field officers for
Virginia. Prominent cadets from VMI include Arctic explorer
Admiral Richard Byrd, World War II General George S. Patton and
General George C. Marshall, who served as President Truman's Sec-
retary of State and received the Nobel Peace Prize for his leadership
in the reconstruction of post-World War II Europe.
These days, however, the most talked about traditions at VMI
are the school's status as a public institution and an admissions policy
that excludes females. After 154 years, these two traditions have been
challenged as irreconcilable under the United States Constitution.
The mission of the VMI is to produce "civilian-soldiers, educated and
honorable men who are suited for leadership in civilian life and who
shrouded in a mist of tradition and romance very difficult for the historian to penetrate."). See
also MCPHERSON, supra note 3, at 724; BRUCE CATrON, NEVER CALL RETREAT 352-53
(1965).
6. TURNER, supra note 5, at 84-89.
7. HARRY F. BYRD, JR., THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE: IN PEACE A GLORIOUS
ASSET IN WAR A TOWER OF STRENTH 8-9 (1984).
8. MCPHERSON, supra note 3, at 328.
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can provide military leadership when necessary." 9 In furtherance of
this mission, the school has employed since its founding the "adversa-
tive model"-a unique method of education that concentrates on the
character development of young men. "Physical rigor, mental stress,
absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation
of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values are the salient
attributes of the VMI educational experience."10 Derived from the
tradition of the all-male public schools in England, the adversative
model is unique because no other school in the United States offers
this design. " VMI has rigidly maintained both the adversative model
and its single-sex admissions policy throughout its long history.
VMI and the Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina, currently
enmeshed in its own legal battle, are the only state-run single-sex mili-
tary colleges remaining in the United States. State funds comprise
more than $10 million of VMI's $29 million annual budget. "Both
[institutions] are throwbacks to an earlier time, and neither is like
anything else you will find in American higher education."' 2
In early 1991, the Civil Rights Division of the United States
Department of Justice received a letter from a female high school stu-
dent in northern Virginia complaining that VMI's admissions policy
denied her the right to attend. The Justice Department filed suit
against VMI claiming that the state-financed all-male admissions pro-
gram violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. Countering, VMI asserted
that it complied with the constitutional standard for single-sex higher
education enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mississippi Uni-
versity for Women v. Hogan.'3
History has thus come full circle, and the United States finds
itself engaged in yet another battle with the feisty young cadets of
VMI. This time, however, there has been no gallant charge or deci-
sive route. Instead, the Justice Department and VMI have been
locked in a grueling legal battle that has raged on for more than three
years. In June of 1991, VMI scored a direct hit on the opening volley
when United States District Court Judge Jackson Kiser ruled that
VMI could continue its policy of excluding female students.' 4 Judge
Kiser wrote, "VMI is a different type of institution. It has set its eye
9. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 893 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting the final report of
the Mission Study Committee of the VMI Board of Visitors dated May 16, 1986).
10. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991).
11. Id.
12. Bill Lohmann, On Trial, NAT'L L.J., May 6, 1991, at 8.
13. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
14. 766 F. Supp. at 1415.
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on the goal of citizen-soldier and never veered from the path.... VMI
truly marches to the beat of a different drummer and I will permit it
to continue to do so."15
When the case came to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
October 1992, a three-judge panel issued a convoluted opinion that
overturned the district court's ruling but refused to compel VMI to
admit women.I6 Instead, the court conditioned VMI's status as a sin-
gle-sex state institution on Virginia's ability to bring the situation into
conformity with the Equal Protection Clause." While the court
found that VMI's admissions policy was grounded on a legitimate
institutional mission and that the introduction of women would mate-
rially alter the program's strenuous physical and emotional discipline,
the Fourth Circuit ultimately held that the Commonwealth had failed
to demonstrate why this unique educational opportunity should be
offered only to men. 8 The court suggested three ways Virginia might
satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the
state might decide to admit women and adjust VMI's program to
effectuate integration. Second, VMI could become a private institu-
tion and reject all state funding. Third, revisiting the "Separate But
Equal" doctrine, Virginia might decide to offer a parallel institution
or program to women.1
9
This Comment analyzes the VMI case past, present, and future,
beginning with Hogan, the only U.S. Supreme Court case to address a
sex-based admissions policy. Part I of this Comment traces the
Supreme Court's development of the intermediate scrutiny test, while
looking separately at single-sex education jurisprudence within the
federal system. The intermediate standard for gender-based classifica-
tions and cases involving single-sex education evolved at roughly the
same time; however, the line of cases remained separated until they
converged in Hogan. Part I concludes with an examination of Hogan
and its effect on the future of single-sex education.
Part II discusses the opinions of the district court and Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals and their application of the Hogan standard.
More specifically, Part II demonstrates how both courts agreed that:
1) single-sex education is a legitimate form of diversity which serves
an important governmental objective, and 2) VMI's admissions policy
is substantially related to diversity in Virginia's higher education sys-
15. Id.
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tem. The Fourth Circuit, however, remanded the case back to Judge
Kiser when it could not find a reason that this form of diversity, sin-
gle-sex education in the adversative setting, should not also be offered
to women. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Fourth Circuit's
decision.
Finally, Part III offers a policy discussion on the two most signif-
icant issues to follow from the VMI case: 1) the application of the
"separate but equal" doctrine to gender and 2) the future of those
private women's colleges that also discriminate on the basis of sex.
Part III attempts to dispel some myths surrounding these issues-
namely, that "separate but equal" was completely abrogated by
Brown v. Board of Education2' and second, that the private women's
colleges will be unaffected by the VMI case. It will also examine the
influence of "real differences" between men and women-a concept
that led to the intermediate scrutiny standard and a "separate but
equal" doctrine in many sex discrimination cases.
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND SINGLE-SEX
EDUCATION: MARCHING TOWARDS BATTLE
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall.., deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."'2 However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Equal
Protection Clause does not "demand that a [state] statute necessarily
apply equally to all persons" or require "things which are different in
fact... to be treated in law as though they were the same."' 22 As the
Fourth Circuit stated in the VMI case, "no one suggests that equal
protection of the laws requires that all laws apply to all persons with-
out regard to actual differences. "23 These two competing interests-
the neutral application of laws as demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment and the notion that all persons are different to a substan-
tial degree-have made it difficult to give a precise definition to the
phrase "equal protection."
A. The Standard of Intermediate Scrutiny
We do know, however, that prior to 1971, "equal protection"
under the Fourteenth Amendment did not necessarily apply to the
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141,
147 (1940)).
23. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 895.
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women of America. In fact, before the Supreme Court decided Reed
v. Reed,24 the Court reversed gender-based classifications in the same
way it reviewed economic-based classifications-by applying a
rational basis test. The rational basis test requires that a law be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Usually, it
involves deference to the legislature. In Reed, the Court struck down
an Idaho statute that provided for the selection of an administrator
for an intestate estate.25 Under the Idaho statutory scheme, if two
competing applicants were equally qualified, males would be selected
over females without regard to individual qualifications.26 While the
Court failed to enunciate a precise standard of review, it did find that
the rational basis test employed in prior sex discrimination cases was
unsatisfactory and unworkable. If the Court had applied the lesser
rational basis standard of scrutiny in Reed, then it would have been
compelled to uphold the classification in the Idaho statute so long as
the classification was not irrational and was related to any permissible
governmental interest, i.e., administrative convenience. 27
While it was evident that sex-based classifications should be
reviewed under a more exacting level of scrutiny than the rational
basis test, the Court refused to classify those persons treated differ-
ently on the basis of sex as a suspect class, entitling the sex-based
classification to review under the insuperable strict scrutiny test.28
For the next five years, the Court struggled with the meaning of Reed
and its heightened, yet uncertain, standard of review.
In Craig v. Boren,29 the Court finally came to a consensus on the
appropriate standard of review for gender-based classifications.
Referred to today as the "intermediate standard of review," the prin-
ciple established in Craig was that a classification by gender "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives." 30 In Craig, the
Supreme Court invalidated an Oklahoma law which prohibited the
24. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
25. Id. at 74.
26. Id.
27. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). In Hoyt, a Florida statute regulating jury
duty granted women an across-the-board exemption, while males were eligible for jury duty
unless they specifically requested an exemption. Applying the rational basis test, the Court
found the exemption for women not irrational because of administrative convenience.
28. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), Justice Brennan opined that a
gender-based classification was suspect. In that case, however, Brennan stood alone in his
belief that a classification based upon gender was suspect in the same manner as a classification
based upon race.
29. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
30. Id. at 197.
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sale of beer to females under the age of eighteen and to males under
the age of twenty-one. 31 Oklahoma proffered "traffic safety" as its
justification for the disparity in the ages at which males and females
could purchase beer. The Court, however, found the relationship
between the important governmental interest and the gender-based
classification to be a tenous one.32 The state presented no evidence
that a person's sex made him or her more or less likely to drive drunk.
Oklahoma failed to demonstrate that the classification would lead to
the goal of heightened traffic safety. The statute, thus, failed on the
"substantial relationship" prong of the test.
Armed with this new standard of review, the post-Craig Court
possessed the capacity to develop a coherent line of cases addressing
sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.
B. The Single-Sex Education Cases: "Substantial Equality"
While the Supreme Court struggled to craft a consistent standard
of review to apply to sex-based classifications, other federal and state
courts across the country were busy segregating the sexes at public
schools. After Brown v. Board of Education,33 courts had an opportu-
nity to broaden the abrogation of the "separate but equal" doctrine in
public education to desegregate the sexes. Courts, however, contin-
ued to defer to the states on the matter of single-sex education, due to
the long-established tradition of single-sex education, judicial reluc-
tance to second-guess legislative judgments in the area of education, 34
and the availability in most school systems of "substantially equal"
opportunities for the education of women.35
In 1970, however, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia in Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia held that the state could not deny women admission to the
University of Virginia in Charlottesville solely on the basis of sex
without violating the Equal Protection Clause.36 The decision rested
on the fact that the University of Virginia provided women with edu-
cational opportunities not offered at any other public institution in the
state.37 No other institution existed in Virginia that offered women
31. Id. at 191-92.
32. Id. at 199-204.
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. See Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 138 nn.15-18 (D.S.C. 1970), affid mem.,
401 U.S. 951 (1971).
35. See Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W. 2d 86, 99 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
230 (1959); Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W. 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
36. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
37. Id. at 187. The Fourth Circuit embraced the same argument in the VMI case when it
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substantially equal prestige and course selection as did the Charlottes-
ville campus. Had there existed another state school offering the same
opportunities for women as the University of Virginia, the court may
have held differently.38 The court, however, in its opinion stopped
short of striking down all single-sex education in the Commonwealth
of Virginia. Foreshadowing the VMI case, the court stated, "We
decline to do so. Obvious problems beyond our capacity to decide on
this record readily occur. One of Virginia's educational institutions is
military in character. Are women to be admitted [to VMI] on an
equal basis, and if so, are they to wear uniforms and be taught to bear
ans?39arms'?,
Consistent with Kirstein, in 1971 the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina upheld the all-female admis-
sions policy of Winthrop College, a public institution.' The decision
in Williams v. McNair could be harmonized with Kirstein because the
court found that Winthrop College, unlike the University of Virginia,
did not offer a wide curriculum and did not enjoy outstanding prestige
in the state system.4 The men of South Carolina had a wide range of
educational opportunities available to them, none of which were avail-
able only at Winthrop.42 Although the court did not explicitly char-
acterize the institutions as "separate but equal," it seemed evident, as
with Kirstein, that existing single-sex education jurisprudence was
finding its basis in the "separate but equal" doctrine. Where a court
found other institutions in the state providing substantially equal edu-
cational opportunities as the institution in question, courts deferred to
the legislature.
In 1975, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals added a new
element to the single-sex education cases by finding "substantial
equality" between two programs that were not, in fact, equal. In
Vorchheimer v. School District,43 the Third Circuit upheld the admis-
sions policy of an all-male high school located in Philadelphia. Susan
Vorchheimer sought admission to the all-male Central High School,
one of two high schools the city maintained for academically-gifted
found no reason why the women of Virginia should not be afforded the same unique
educational opportunities offered by VMI.
38. See Patricia W. Lamar, The Expansion of Constitutional and Statutory Remedies for
Sex Segregation in Education: The Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 32 EMORY L.J. 1111, 1123 n.52 (1983) (discussing the implications of an
institution which is equal in prestige and course offering to the University of Virginia).
39. Kirstein, 309 F. Supp. at 187.
40. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), a'd mem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
41. 316 F. Supp. at 138-39.
42. Id. at 137-38.
43. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), affid by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
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students. The other high school was Girls High, the all-female coun-
terpart to Central.' Finding no denial of equal protection, the Third
Circuit utilized the "substantially equal" rationale from Williams and
Kirstein, even though the court found the two schools not equal.45
Susan Vorchheimer wished to attend Central to take advantage of its
superior science facilities. By attending Girls High, students wishing
to pursue a career in the sciences were disadvantaged. Despite this
recognized inequality, the Vorchheimer court emphasized the need to
allow "innovation in methods and techniques" to provide quality edu-
cation.46 The court then found that, irrespective of the differences in
the science programs, the two schools were substantially equal and
generally comparable in prestige and quality. In 1977, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed Vorchheimer without an opinion.4
Kirstein, Williams, and Vorchheimer, taken together, provided
strong support for what, at that time, was an emerging basis for decid-
ing the single-sex education issue. The courts' inquiry in each case
became a question of whether there were "substantially equal" alter-
natives to the challenged single-sex institution. If "substantially
equal" institutions existed, there would be no violation of equal
protection.
The value of these cases as precedent is questionable. Each court
couched its opinion in sexist and stereotypical undertones that under-
mined the weight of its authority.4 9 Each decision, however, did rec-
ognize some legitimate and useful factors in the evaluation of single-
sex education-factors that would later be employed in the VMI case.
In Kirstein, the court took note of the long-established tradition of
single-sex education, 50 while the Vorchheimer court cited respected
authority to support the maintenance of single-sex schools.5" Fur-
thermore, the court in Vorchheimer expressed concern about denying
44. 532 F.2d at 881.
45. Id. at 886-87.
46. Id. at 882.
47. Id.
48. 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam).
49. The court in Kirstein ridiculed the notion of women wearing military uniforms and
bearing arms. 309 F. Supp. at 187. At the same time, the Williams court supported South
Carolina's purpose for establishing Winthrop College-to prepare women to give instruction
in typing, sewing, stenography, and similar skills "suitable to their sex." 316 F. Supp. at 136
n.3. Moreover, it has been observed that the Vorchheimer court, by finding both high schools
equal, stereotyped that because girls are not as interested in the sciences as boys, the facilities
need not be equal. See Caren Dubnoff, Does Gender Equality Always Imply Gender Blindness?
The Status of Single-Sex Education for Women, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 295, 312 (1984); Lamar,
supra note 38, at 1128.
50. 309 F. Supp. at 186.
51. 532 F.2d at 887.
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the freedom of choice to those parents and students who wished to
continue single-sex education.52 Along similar lines, the Williams
court found that "flexibility and diversity in educational methods,
when not tainted with racial overtones, often are both desirable and
beneficial; they should be encouraged, not condemned." ' 3
C. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
The factors and concerns expressed by the Kirstein, Williams and
Vorchheimer courts evidenced the judiciary's uneasiness to strike
down public single-sex education. The courts recognized the tradi-
tions of the schools, the pedagogical virtues of single-sex education
and the differences between men and women. As a result, the courts
decided that the Equal Protection Clause does not mandate elimina-
tion of this form of schooling. The United States Supreme Court,
however, had not yet decided on the issue outright. Armed with its
new intermediate standard of review, the Supreme Court underwent
the task of applying this heightened scrutiny to single-sex education.54
Established in 1884, The Mississippi University for Women
(MUW) was Mississippi's only single-sex public institution in 1982.
Joe Hogan, a Mississippi resident, sought to enroll in the university's
nursing program, but the university denied him admission based on
his sex.55 In Hogan, the Court decided to refrain from deciding the
important issue of whether public single-sex education is a per se
denial of equal protection. Instead, the Court used the intermediate
scrutiny test to find that Mississippi's exclusion of males from the
School of Nursing, but not from the entire university, violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.56 Since Mississippi simply did not offer Joe
Hogan an alternative public nursing program, the Court was not
forced to address the question of whether a state may provide "sepa-
rate but equal" educational institutions for males and females."
According to Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, Mississippi
held the burden of demonstrating an "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" for the gender-based classification at the nursing school.5 The
state could satisfy its burden only "by showing at least that the classi-
fication serves 'important governmental objectives and that the dis-
criminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the
52. Id. at 888.
53. 316 F. Supp. at 138.
54. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
55. Id. at 720-21.
56. Id. at 733.
57. Id. at 721 n.I.
58. Id. at 724 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)).
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achievement of those objectives.' "9 In addition, the intermediate
scrutiny standard must be applied "free of fixed notions concerning
the roles and abilities of males and females."'  In other words, the
Court must assure that the state's objective does not reflect archaic
and stereotypical notions.
Although intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause traditionally required a state to satisfy two prongs61an
important governmental objective and a substantial relationship-
Justice O'Connor, in essence, established a third prong in Hogan. By
ensuring that the other prongs were applied "free of fixed notions"
about the sexes, the validity of sex-based classifications could now be
determined only through "reasoned analysis rather than through the
mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate assumptions
about the proper roles of men and women. '62
The addition of this third prong resulted in the demise of
MUW's all-female nursing program. While Mississippi sought to jus-
tify the single-sex program as a means of compensating women for
past discrimination (an important governmental objective), it failed to
recognize that in a traditionally female dominated occupation such as
nursing, women had suffered no discrimination at all. Moreover, Jus-
tice O'Connor, eager to apply her third prong, found that "MUW's
policy of excluding males from admission to the School of Nursing
tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively
woman's job."' 63 In the end, Mississippi failed all prongs of intermedi-
ate scrutiny.
D. What Hogan Means
At this point it is more appropriate to ask what Hogan does not
mean. Clearly, Justice O'Connor's opinion indicated that she
intended Hogan to be a narrow decision. One should recall, however,
that in a similar vein the Warren Court intended for courts to apply
Brown v. Board of Education" narrowly to the public schools. Is
Hogan to become the Brown for "separate but equal" schooling based
on sex?
Hogan, standing alone, is not and has never been read as a broad
denunciation of publicly financed single-sex education. In footnote
59. Id. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
60. Id. at 724-25.
61. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); supra notes 29-32 and accompanying
text.
62. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726.
63. Id. at 729.
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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seven of Hogan, Justice O'Connor addressed those who might use the
Court's decision to assert that all state supported single-sex education
is hereafter inherently unequal and a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. O'Connor wrote: "Because Hogan's claim is thus limited...
we decline to address the question of whether MUW's admissions pol-
icy, as applied to males seeking admission to schools other than the
School of Nursing, violates the Fourteenth Amendment."6 How-
ever, the explicit narrowness of the opinion unsettled several justices
on the Court. Believing that Justice O'Connor failed to emphasize the
narrowness of her opinion, Chief Justice Burger wrote a one para-
graph dissent emphasizing that the Court's holding was "limited to
the context of a professional nursing school."66 Justice Blackmun's
dissent claimed that there could be an "inevitable spillover from the
Court's ruling" and that "[t]he Court's reasoning does not stop with
the School of Nursing of the Mississippi University for Women."67
Finally, Justice Powell wrote that "[t]he logic of the Court's entire
opinion.., appears to apply sweepingly to the entire University....
Nor does the opinion anywhere deny that this analysis applies to the
entire University."68 The narrow holding of Hogan and the extent of
the dissenters' concern evidenced at least some desire by the Court to
preserve single-sex education. Should the Court someday determine
that such schooling constitutes a per se violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, then clearly Hogan would not be the sword used to strike
the blow.
In addition, the Hogan decision has never been interpreted to
mean that "separate but equal" single-sex educational institutions are
unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor, again in a footnote, addressed
this concern by writing, "Mississippi maintains no other single-sex
public university or college. Thus, we are not faced with the question
of whether States can provide 'separate but equal' undergraduate
institutions for males or females." 69 In other words, the Court would
not use Hogan to overturn Vorchheimer or its summary affirmance in
Williams. Again, the dissenters feared that courts would translate the
majority's reasoning into an abrogation of "separate but equal" in the
context of sex-based classifications.7 ° This fear, however, was never
65. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723 n.7.
66. Id. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 734 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 745 (Powell, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 720 n. 1.
70. Id. at 734 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("That ruling, it seems to me, places in
constitutional jeopardy any state-supported educational institution that confines its student
body in any area to members of one sex, even though the State elsewhere provides an
equivalent program to the complaining applicant.").
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realized since subsequent cases, including VMI, have continued to
recognize the vitality of the "separate but equal" doctrine in some
gender-based classifications.
So what exactly does Hogan stand for other than an isolated
problem of discrimination at a small, Southern nursing school? The
broad effect of Hogan is its requirement that courts must now scruti-
nize a state's proffered justification for maintaining a single-sex insti-
tution so as to ensure that the legislation serves an important
governmental objective.71 Courts will no longer simply defer to state
legislatures' interests or objectives without exacting a heightened scru-
tiny. If this is the case, then what does Hogan say about acceptable
governmental interests? What state justifications for the continued
existence of a single-sex institution will rise to the level of satisfying
the standard of review required by Hogan?
Justice O'Connor's opinion fails to enumerate which educational
objectives might satisfy intermediate scrutiny; however, it does reveal
that "compensation for past discrimination" is not an important gov-
ernmental interest unless the program is actually used to redress an
existing burden caused by past discrimination.72 For instance, the
Hogan Court cited to Schlesinger v. Ballard,73 where it upheld a fed-
eral law allowing female Navy officers to serve four years longer than
male officers before implementation of a mandatory discharge. In
Schlesinger, the Court validated the gender-based statute in order to
compensate for the burden female officers suffered as a result of the
national policy restricting females from combat duty. Since women
could not participate in combat, the Court reasoned, they had fewer
opportunities for promotion than the male officers. 74 The four addi-
tional years gave women the chance to reach a particular rank before
discharge.
While, in some circumstances, a compensatory purpose may jus-
tify a discriminatory program, "compensation" is at the same time
limited as an important governmental interest by the Court's require-
ment that the challenged program be created in order to neutralize an
existing burden.7 ' Thus, Justice O'Connor's sole example in Hogan of
71. See Deborah B. Rose, Sex Discrimination in Higher Education-The U.S Supreme
Court and a Bastion of Tradition: Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 1983 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 71, 84; Jack G. Steigelfest, The End of An Era for Single-Sex Schools? Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, 15 CONN. L. REV. 353, 372 (1983).
72. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728 ("In limited circumstance, a gender-based classification
favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is
disproportionately burdened.").
73. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
74. Id. at 508.
75. See Steigelfest, supra note 71, at 373.
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a governmental objective important enough to satisfy the first prong
of intermediate scrutiny may be routinely difficult to demonstrate. In
the case of VMI, the single-sex tradition does not serve any compen-
satory purpose. What else then constitutes an important governmen-
tal objective satisfing intermediate scrutiny? Were the Hogan
dissenters justified in their fears about Justice O'Connor's facially nar-
row opinion? While O'Connor professed to limit her opinion to
MUW's nursing school, the failure to cite any other potentially
important governmental interests creates a barrier in and of itself for
any non-compensatory single-sex state program to satisfy the first
prong of intermediate scrutiny. Hogan's message to the states may be,
"If you did not impose your gender-based classification with a com-
pensatory purpose in mind, then that classification will not satisfy the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause."
E. Diversity as an Important Governmental Objective
The Hogan dissenters accounted for the deficiencies in
O'Connor's majority opinion by offering what they viewed as at least
one other important governmental objective served by the program at
MUW-the diversity in education offered by the school's single-sex
status.76 Hoping to salvage single-sex education from what he saw as
a harmfully broad decision, Justice Powell wrote:
A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been respect for
diversity. This has been characteristic of the peoples from numer-
ous lands who have built our country. It is the essence of our dem-
ocratic system. At stake in this case ... is the preservation of a
small aspect of this diversity ... [and] that aspect is by no means
insignificant, given our heritage of available choice between single-
sex and coeducational institutions of higher learning.77
From the standpoint of Justices Powell, Blackmun and Rehnquist, the
situation at MUW concerned not just the School of Nursing or even
single-sex education at large; rather, it involved the deterioration of
certain values, such as diversity and "relegat[ing] ourselves to need-
less conformity."78 By trying to elevate diversity in educational expe-
rience to an important governmental objective, the dissenters hoped
to avert, and probably foresaw, a future crisis that would threaten
single-sex education in the name of conformity.
At the time of the Hogan decision, however, "diversity" as an
important governmental objective was not a new concept to the
76. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 735 (Powell, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 745.
78. Id. at 734-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court. Five years earlier, in the landmark case Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,79 the Court characterized the
attainment of a diverse student body as "a constitutionally permissible
goal for an institution of higher education""0 and held that a race-
conscious college admissions program could attract students that
would contribute to the "robust exchange of ideas."'" Moreover, on
at least one occasion since Hogan and Bakke, the Court has used the
"diversity" rationale to uphold a suspect classification.82 The Court
in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC upheld a Federal Communications
Commission plan to prefer minority-owned radio stations in awarding
broadcast licenses. The Court found that "the interest in enhancing
broadcast diversity is... an important governmental objective and is
therefore a sufficient basis for the [FCC's] minority ownership
policies." '8 3
The Supreme Court is not the only branch of our federal govern-
ment to justify certain classifications and preferences on the basis of
diversity. The United States Congress has employed the theme of
"preserving diversity in education" to protect the status of single-sex
schools. In 1972, Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments which prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance.84 Although Title IX
made it impossible for most institutions receiving federal funds to
deny admission to a person based on gender, the drafters took care to
exempt certain institutions from the statute's prohibitions. Specifi-
cally, the act exempted "any public institution of undergraduate
higher learning which is an institution that traditionally and continu-
ally from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students
of one sex."8" The House Reports to Title IX explicitly recognized
the importance of single-sex institutions to diverse educational
experiences:
One of the great strengths of the American higher education sys-
79. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
80. Id. at 311-12.
81. Id. at 313.
82. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
83. Id. at 567-68.
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
85. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (1976) (emphasis added). It is important to note that neither
Hogan nor VMI was decided on a statutory basis. Rather, a constitutional equal protection
rationale justified each decision. The provisions of the Education Amendments did not impact
either case since each plaintiff challenged the school's constitutional, rather than statutory,
obligation. Furthermore, in addressing the limited impact of Congress' exemption of single-
sex schools, Justice O'Connor wrote, "[N]either Congress nor a state can validate a law that
denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Hogan, 458 U.S. at 732-33.
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tem is its tremendous diversity in types of educational institutions
and experiences. Students should be allowed to choose on the basis
of personal preference, and colleges should have an absolute right
to offer, the type of environment they desire in college ....
Equality in education does not mean that all colleges must be
equal, or that all students must go to the same school. Neither
should it mean that individual colleges should be precluded from
determining for themselves the makeup of their own student
body.8
6
In the floor debates on the Title IX exemptions, Senator Lloyd Bent-
sen of Texas argued on behalf of Texas Women's University, a state-
supported single-sex college:
The women attending this institution do so voluntarily because
they wish to have the experience of attending an all female institu-
tion. If they did not want to attend, they could go to ... another
institution of higher education ....... [Texas Woman's Univer-
sity] has a cohesiveness that other institutions do not have. It is a
unique and distinctive institution, and it should be allowed to
87
exist.
III. THE CASE OF THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE
Armed with the single-sex education cases and legislative treat-
ment of the issue by both Congress and the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia,8 the VMI cadets once again emerged from their campus
barracks to fight another battle, this time a legal battle, with the
United States. Seizing upon the theme of Justice Powell's dissent in
Hogan, the school grounded its position on what has been called the
"endangered species argument. ' 89 VMI planned to convince the Dis-
trict Court that it provides an important kind of educational diversity
on the verge of extinction.
By depending upon educational diversity as its important govern-
mental objective, VMI may have triggered its own demise. The
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia,
86. H.R. REP. No. 554, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462,
2590.
87. 118 CONG. REC. S5814 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
88. VMI is controlled by a board of visitors which is controlled by the General Assembly
of Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-92 (Michie 1985). The board decides "the terms upon
which cadets may be admitted, their number, the course of their instruction, the nature of their
service and the duration thereof." Id. § 23-104. Commonwealth policy dictates that the
boards of visitors of its public colleges and universities have broad autonomy in determining
the institution's mission, including the school's admissions policies. See id. §§ 23-9.2:3 and 23-
9.6:1.
89. VMI Appeals to US. Supreme Court, UPI, Jan. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File [hereinafter VMI Appeals].
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under Judge Kiser, ruled in favor of VMI based on the diversity argu-
ment. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, while
applauding VMI's diversity, remanded the case back to the district
court so that Virginia could implement a plan that would offer this
type of educational diversity to the women of Virginia as well.90 On
May 24, 1993, the United States Supreme Court refused to grant cer-
tiorari prior to final judgment in the litigation below.9
A. The First Battle: A VMI Victory
In VMI's case before the district court, Virginia was called upon
to satisfy Hogan's intermediate scrutiny test. The court essentially
accepted VMI's proffered argument in three parts. First, Judge Kiser
found diversity in education is a legitimate governmental objective.92
Second, the court held that single-sex education is a constitutionally
legitimate form of diversity. 93 Finally, the court found that the nega-
tive effects of coeducation at VMI under the adversative model sup-
ported a substantial relationship between the single-sex admissions
policy and the state objective of educational diversity.94
1. PEDAGOGICAL VIRTUES OF SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION
In the VMI case, both the district court and the court of appeals
placed tremendous weight on the pedagogical virtues of single-sex
education. Judge Kiser relied principally on almost thirty pages of
"findings of fact" which demonstrated the positive impact of single-
sex education on both sexes.95 The court noted, "For those students
[both male and female], the opportunity to attend a single-sex college
is a valuable one, likely to lead to better academic and professional
achievement." 96
As applied to women, the empirical evidence amply supports
Judge Kiser's findings. Studies show that all-female institutions accel-
erate women into normally male-dominated fields such as science,
politics and business. 97 Forty-two percent of the women members of
Congress attended private women's colleges, as did one-third of the
90. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
91. Virginia Military Institute v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
92. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (W.D. Va. 1991).
93. Id. at 1412.
94. Id. at 1413.
95. Id. at 1415-43.
96. Id. at 1412.
97. See, e.g., Sharon K. Mollman, The Gender Gap: Separating the Sexes in Public
Education, 68 IND. L.J. 149, 171 (1992).
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women on the boards of Fortune 1000 companies. 98 One 1976 study
ranked 137 colleges and universities according to the number of doc-
torate degrees received by women. Of the top twenty-five schools,
twelve of them were all-female institutions.99 Other studies support
these observations as well. In 1979, educator Alexander Astin wrote
in his renowned study of single-sex education that "[s]ingle-sex col-
leges show a pattern of effects on both sexes that is almost uniformly
positive. Students of both sexes become more academically involved,
interact with faculty frequently, show large increases in intellectual
self-esteem and are more satisfied with practically all aspects of the
college experience ... compared with their counterparts in coeduca-
tional institutions."" ° In yet another report, cited by the Fourth Cir-
cuit, researchers found that both males and females were more likely
to pursue nontraditional, nonstereotypical careers if they attended
single-sex schools.' 0 Finally, the pedagogical justification of single-
sex education is evidenced in the shear number of students who con-
tinue to attend these schools. Although there has been an overall
decline in the number of single-sex schools since the passage of Title
IX of the Education Amendments, these institutions account for a
large number of students who choose the experience of single-sex edu-
cation. As of 1990, there were approximately 75,000 men and women
enrolled in single-sex institutions.102
Notwithstanding the empirical evidence, the diversity offered by
VMI is not based solely on its status as another single-sex college.
Rather, VMI also offers a unique method of education known as the
adversative model. The unique nature of this military-style education
ultimately led the district court to find that VMI satisfied the second
prong of the intermediate scrutiny test-that a substantial relation-
ship between excluding females and the legitimate governmental
objective of educational diversity existed. 0 3
2. THE ADVERSATIVE MODEL: A METHOD OF INSTRUCTION
UNIQUE IN ALL THE WORLD
The second prong of Hogan's intermediate scrutiny test requires
98. Edward B. Fiske, Lessons, N.Y. TIMEs, June 14, 1989 at B8; Mona Charan, Single-sex
education has its place, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1994, at A9.
99. See Dubnoff, supra note 49, at 324.
100. ALEXANDER W. ASTIN, FOUR CRITICAL YEARS 246 (1979).
101. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 897 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Marvin Bressler &
Peter Wendell, The Sex Composition of Selective Colleges and Gender Differences in Career
Aspirations, 51 J. HIGHER EDUc. 650, 652 (1980)).
102. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1420 (W.D. Va. 1991).
103. Id. at 1413.
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that the discriminatory means employed by a state be "substantially
related" to the achievement of the state's important governmental
objective."° In United States v. Virginia, the district court found
VMI's exclusion of women was directly and substantially related to
the Commonwealth's goal of diversity in a way that the policy invali-
dated in Hogan was not. Judge Kiser's conclusions were based on
extensive evidence in the record showing that a "method of instruc-
tion ... unique in all the world"' 05 would be altered, if not lost for-
ever, were VMI forced to admit women. Coeducation would
jeopardize the successful operation of VMI's educational program,
commonly referred to as "adversative."'106
VMI's educational method serves an objective quite different
from the national military academies which have all integrated
women within the last twenty years. The mission of West Point, the
Naval Academy, and the Air Force Academy is to prepare cadets for
career service in the armed forces. 10 7 VMI's mission, on the other
hand, is to educate and train young men as citizen-soldiers. In fact,
only fifteen percent of VMI's cadets actually ever begin a career in
military service.'10
In furtherance of the VMI mission, the school utilizes the adver-
sative model of education-a "highly specialized program for the dis-
tinctive physiological and developmental characteristics of males."' 0 9
Since the program is tailored specifically to the distinctive physiologi-
cal attributes of men, the exclusion of females may not be character-
ized as invidious. In the past, the Supreme Court has allowed
classifications based on biological differences for the simple reason
that they "realistically reflect the fact that the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances.""'  A glance at the VMI program
reveals that the sexes are not similarly situated to benefit from the
adversative model.
The district court in VMI found that "physical rigor, mental
stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute reg-
ulation of behavior, and indoctrination of desirable values are the sali-
ent attributes of the VMI educational experience.""' The district
104. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
105. 766 F. Supp. at 1415.
106. Brief for Appellee at 20, United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992) (No.
91-1690) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
107. 766 F. Supp. at 1432.
108. Id. at 1432.
109. Brief for Appellee, supra note 106, at 20.
110. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981).
111. 766 F. Supp. at 1421.
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court, all testifying experts, and the Fourth Circuit agreed that the
adversative model is the composition of several individual programs,
of which the elimination of any one program would have negative
consequences on the entire educational experience. 1 2 Although the
Fourth Circuit cited six different programs within the VMI, only four
are truly unique in comparison to other higher educational institu-
tions-the "rat line," the class system, the dyke system, and barracks
life."13
The "rat line" describes the first year cadet program. A first year
cadet is called a "rat" because, as one expert testified, the rat is "prob-
ably the lowest animal on earth."' 1 4 The rat line is comparable to the
physical rigor and mental stress of the Marine Corps boot camp.
Punishment and reward are the fundamentals of this intense first year
program. Thousands of regulations govern cadet life.I Dr. Richard
Richardson, Jr., one of VMI's experts who also served on a committee
to evaluate West Point, testified that the rat line "challenges all values
and all forms of behavior in order to instill the values and behaviors
for which VMI exists."' 6 Since punishment is collective as well as
individual, class solidarity and individual responsibility are the rat
line's main by-products. The rat line is "sufficiently rigorous and
stressful that those who complete it feel both a sense of accomplish-
ment and a bonding to their fellow sufferers and former
tormentors.""
7
While the rat line strips away old values and behaviors, the class
and dyke systems reinforce new values and behaviors. The class sys-
tem maintains constant supervision of cadets and an intricate system
of privileges which rewards desired behavior. The dyke system pro-
vides young cadets with upper class mentors who serve as models for
leadership and guidance. A first classman, called a "dyke," is
assigned to each rat as his mentor.
Barracks life at VMI is at the center of all these systems. The
barracks integrate the VMI educational method into a unified experi-
ence. Cadets must live in the barracks during their four years at
VMI. At trial, the court heard testimony that "[u]nlike most colleges,
where the library is central and the dormitories are peripheral, the
most important aspects of the VMI educational experience occur in
112. Id. at 1422; United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 896 (4th Cir. 1992).
113. See 766 F. Supp. at 1422-23.
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the barracks."II More specifically, the twin pillars of the VMI expe-
rience-"the egalitarian nature of the program.., and the complete
absence of privacy which permits an openness and scrutiny that
assure adherence to the system"--exist primarily through barracks
life at the institute.'1 9
Indeed, the spartan conditions of the barracks further the open-
ness and egalitarian environment required for the adversative model
to succeed. The barracks are "stark and unattractive."1 20 There are
no locks on the doors of the cadets' rooms. The windows of the bar-
racks have no window shades or curtains. Toilet and shower facilities
are exposed. In most instances, a cadet cannot shower or go to the
bathroom without being observed by everyone in the building. Venti-
lation is poor. The occupancy rate is 3.7 cadets per room. According
to Dr. Richardson, "the barracks is 'definitely unattractive and it is an
unappealing place unless you consider the purpose for which it exists.
It is designed to provide people with an intensive laboratory in human
development. It exists to place people under stress.' ",121
3. ADMITTING WOMEN TO VMI: DESTRUCTION OF THE
ADVERSATIVE MODEL
Applicants seek admission to VMI because it is regarded as the
most challenging military school in the United States.1 22 For many
young men, the adversative model provides the best education they
can receive. However, as both Judge Kiser and the Fourth Circuit
found, if VMI were to admit women, the most crucial elements of the
adversative model would have to be substantially altered in order to
accommodate the needs and interests of the female cadets. 2 3 This
would frustrate adversative model, thereby eliminating most of VMI's
contribution to diversity in higher education in Virginia.
The Fourth Circuit recognized the irony of the situaiton. "The
Catch-22 is that women are denied the opportunity when excluded
from VMI and cannot be given the opportunity by admitting them,
because the change caused by their admission would destroy the
opportunity."' 24 Females seeking admission to VMI with hopes of
118. Id. at 1423.
119. Brief for Appellee, supra note 106, at 23.
120. 766 F. Supp. at 1424.
121. Brief for Appellee, supra note 106, at 24.
122. 766 F. Supp. at 1421.
123. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he introduction of
women at VMI will materially alter the very program in which women seek to partake."); 766
F. Supp. at 1413 ("some aspects of the distinctive method would be altered if it were to admit
women.").
124. 976 F.2d at 897.
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experiencing the benefits of the adversative model would find that, by
the time they arrived in Lexington, the adversative model would no
longer exist. VMI would no longer be VMI. Griffin Bell, former
United States Attorney General and attorney for VMI, argued before
the Fourth Circuit that "VMI can't be VMI if it lets women in.... By
obtaining what she wants, [the plaintiff would] lose what she wants
because it wouldn't be there anymore. '" 25 The VMI experience is
holistic to such a degree that changing any one component part of the
model would result in an altogether different system of education.'26
Both the trial and appellate courts determined, on the basis of expert
testimony, that integration of women at VMI would require several
changes in the program which would force VMI to adopt a develop-
mental method of schooling similar to the one at West Point. 27
The reference to West Point is not made to show that coeduca-
tion at our nation's military academies has been unsuccessful or that
coeducation is an insurmountable barrier to those who have had to
redesign their schools' programs. The obstacles accompanying inte-
gration are a small price to pay for the worthwhile objective of educa-
tional equality. However, West Point's and the other national service
academies' experiences suggest that VMI, if forced to integrate, will
undoubtedly have to change or abandon the principles which have
been the sole reason for the school's very existence and heritage.
Unlike the racial desegregation of public schools, integration at VMI
would benefit neither females nor males. Instead, the Commonwealth
of Virginia with an integrated VMI would lose what it considers to be
an essential element of diversity in its system of higher education. 121
The prophetic tales of integration at West Point and the other
service academies demonstrate the inevitable demise of the adversa-
tive model at VMI. Since 1976, the year West Point admitted its first
female cadet, physical standards have been lowered to accommodate
the different physiological differences between men and women. 29
Basic training is now divided into groups according to ability. Physi-
cal activities are assigned to cadets on the basis of gender. Men are
required to perform pull-ups while women must execute a flexed-arm
125. Suzanne Fields, Reprieve for Brother Rat, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1992, at GI.
126. Brief for Appellee, supra note 106, at 28.
127. 766 F. Supp. at 1440; 976 F. 2d at 897.
128. The 1991 Report of the Commission on the University of the 21st Century to the
Governor and General Assembly of Virginia boasted, "The formal system of higher education
in Virgnia includes a great array of institutions: state supported and independent, two year
and senior, research and highly specialized, traditionally black and single-sex." Brief for
Appellee, supra note 106, at 12.
129. BRIAN MITCHELL, WEAK LINK: THE FEMINIZATION OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY
69 (1989).
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hang. 130 Men must box and wrestle while women learn karate and
self defense (and "interpretive dancing" at the Coast Guard Acad-
emy).13 1 Men felt that they were the victims of a double standard.
"[S]ince the women learned neither to box nor to wrestle, and their
close-quarters training emphasized self-defense, they never had
bloody noses. The men were outraged, since deep down they knew
war was about bloody noses."' 32 Instead of wearing combat boots
during running exercises, cadets wear running shoes. Running events
no longer required cadets to carry weapons.
As for the facilities, doors on cadets rooms are now locked and
solid. Modifications have been made for jewelry, dress, and hair
length. Hazing practices, upperclassmen yelling at cadets, and requir-
ing physical activities such as push-ups as punishment have been elim-
inated. Furthermore, studies show that since integration at the
academies, unit morale has declined as a result of cross-sexual rela-
tionships and the distractions associated with them. 133 The attrition
rate for female cadets has been far greater than that for male
cadets.I34 There have been complaints of sexual harassment. 35
Additionally, more than half of the women at the academies believe
that gender integration has been unsuccessful. 136
While the hardships and changes associated with integration at
the academies have proven necessary, they provide concrete support
for the proposition that women and men are not similarly situated to
benefit from the adversative model at VMI. Integration at VMI
would introduce class differences not currently present in its egalita-
rian atmosphere. The introduction of privacy would eliminate the
central element of barracks life-constant scrutiny. Physical educa-
tion requirements and the rat line would have to be altered to reflect
physiological differences. VMI would have two choices: either lower
the physical standards for all cadets or introduce the concept of com-
parable training, which allows females to perform less strenuous tasks
than male cadets. While the former would undermine the intensity of
the program for the males, the latter would undermine the adversative
principle of egalitarianism at VMI. Finally, integration would dis-
tract men and women from their studies by adding outside pressures
related to dating-pressure a number of cadets seek to escape by
130. 766 F. Supp. at 1439.
131. MITCHELL, supra note 129, at 70.
132. Id.






choosing VMI. 137 As a VMI expert on education testified, "the adver-
sative model of education is simply inappropriate for the vast majority
of women." '138
B. The Second Battle: Fighting to a Draw
After holding that VMI could continue its single-sex admissions
policy, district court Judge Kiser stated, "VMI is a different type of
institution. It has set its eye on the goal of citizen-soldier and never
veered from the path it has chosen to meet that goal. VMI truly
marches to the beat of a different drummer and I will permit it to
continue to do SO.' 1 39 Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals was neither as eager nor as articulate in coming to the rescue
of the historic VMI. Instead, the appellate court issued an opinion
that left litigants on both sides of the issue with mixed messages.i °
As previously noted, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district
court in nearly all of its findings and reasoning. The Fourth Circuit
agreed with VMI that its civilian-soldier mission is appropriate and
successful; that the adversative model justifies a single-sex admissions
policy; that the key aspects of VMI's program would be "materially
altered" by the presence of women; and, that if women were admitted
to VMI, they would not benefit from VMI as it now exists because
coeducation would completely alter the school.' The court, never-
theless, overturned Judge Kiser's ruling and remanded the case to the
district court to implement a plan that brings VMI into conformity
with the Equal Protection Clause.'42 While the Fourth Circuit agreed
with the positive contributions of VMI to Virginia's educational
diversity, the court found that the Commonwealth failed to advance
any state policy for affording VMI's diverse education to men and not
to women. 1 3 Judge Niemeyer noted that
[i]f VMI's male-only admissions policy is in furtherance of a state
policy of "diversity," the explanation of how the policy is furthered
by affording a unique educational benefit only to males is lacking.
A policy of diversity which aims to provide an array of educational
opportunities, including single-gender institutions, must do more
137. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1412 (W.D. Va. 1991).
138. Id. at 1413.
139. Id. at 1415.
140. Marching Forward: A Court Ruling Paves the Way for Women at Virginia Military
Institute, TIME, Oct. 19, 1992, at 22.
141. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
142. Id. at 900.
143. Id. at 898 ("The decisive question in this case therefore transforms to one of why the
Commonwealth of Virginia offers the opportunity only to men.").
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than favor one gender. 44
The Fourth Circuit's decision, while not explicitly ordering VMI
to admit women, nonetheless, struck a lethal blow to the Institute.
The decision left VMI with three alternatives for bringing the school
into conformity with the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the school
might "properly decide to admit women and adjust the program to
implement that choice."1 45 Second, VMI could relinquish its status as
a public institution by becoming private.1 46 Finally, Virginia could
establish parallel institutions or programs-the politically correct
phraseology for "separate but equal."'' 47
Ultimately, VMI's diversity argument, which helped the school
prevail in the case before the district court, became its stumbling
block in the Fourth Circuit. VMI's reliance on the diversity rationale
may have been misplaced for the simple reason that VMI's contribu-
tion to the Commonwealth was a "diversity of exclusion" instead of a
"diversity of inclusion." The cases relied upon in support of "diver-
sity" involved programs that broadened all students' opportunities,
rather than simply a particular class of students. For example, in
Bakke, the University of California implemented its admissions pro-
gram to create a diverse student body-it admitted students who
otherwise might not have attended the school. Similarly, in the Wil-
liams and Vorchheimer cases, the diversity arguments succeeded
because the schools' programs enhanced educational opportunities for
all. Those courts supported single-sex education because other "sepa-
rate but equal" institutions offered members of the opposite sex sub-
stantially similar opportunities. This enhanced diversity because all
students could choose a particular type of education in either a co-ed
or single-sex setting. At VMI, only males could choose to endure the
adversative style of instruction.148
The diversity argument seems to carry less weight when one con-
siders the homogeneity of the case law relied upon by VMI. Support
for "diversity in education" is found mainly in Bakke and in the
Hogan dissent. Those two opinions have one thing in common-Jus-
tice Powell. While Justice Powell believed it was a legitimate goal for
144. Id. at 899.
145. Id. at 900.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. The Fourth Circuit noted that, at one point, it was suggested that the women in
Virginia did have an option to partake in a similar method of schooling in the ROTC program
of Virginia Tech. The argument was not pressed, however, since, by conceding the availability
of a similar program, VMI would have undermined its own argument that it is "unique" to the
state. 976 F.2d at 898 n.8.
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states to create "diverse microcosms in a pluralistic society," 149 his
position essentially remains unsupported by other members of the
high Court. VMI's reliance on Powell's theories means it relied on a
notion of what "diversity" is in the mind of one Justice, rather than
the entire Court.
After the Fourth Circuit's decision, VMI appealed to the United
States Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of its single-sex
admissions policy. 5 ° Judge Niemeyer's opinion certainly weakened
the diversity argument. As a result, it became extremely difficult to
demonstrate to the Court why this opportunity should be offered to
men and not to women. While diversity may be a dead issue, the
Fourth Circuit's opinion raised an equally complicated issue not dis-
cussed until the case reached the appellate court. Of the three options
the Fourth Circuit offered Virginia, only one seems workable-to cre-
ate a parallel institution. In fact, the Fourth Circuit subtly
encouraged this option. Commenting on the adversative program, the
court wrote, "Although it is readily apparent from the evidence that
the rigor of the physical training at VMI is tailored to males, in the
context of a single-sex female institution, it could be adjusted without
detrimental effect."' 5' To many women, however, this option is
equally offensive because it calls into debate the "separate but equal"
doctrine as applied to females.' 52 While VMI pursues this course in
the wake of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, a legal battle is
waiting to emerge on this issue alone. 5 3
IV. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE BATTLE FOR VMI: A POLICY
DISCUSSION ON THE EMERGING SINGLE-SEX ISSUES
While VMI's future remains uncertain in the aftermath of the
Fourth Circuit's decision, greater uncertainty has been generated by
the battle's effect on established norms, institutions and legal princi-
ples. There are at least two important issues certain to arise from
VMI's struggle. First, controversy is certain to follow the Fourth Cir-
cuit's suggestion that VMI create a "parallel institution."1 54 This, of
course, unearths the old "separate but equal" doctrine in public edu-
149. See Alan Howard & Bruce Howard, Political Equality, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1615,
1631-32 (1983).
150. VMI Appeals, supra note 89.
151. 976 F.2d at 898 (emphasis added).
152. See Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Miss. 1987) and United States v.
Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992) for recent "separate but equal" cases.
153. See John F. Harris, U.S. Court Declares VMI's All-Male Policy Unconstitutional,
WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1992, at Cl.
154. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992).
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cation. 155 The Supreme Court has never decided the issue of whether
"separate but equal" is appropriate in a single-sex public school
setting.
Another issue which may emerge if VMI is forced to admit
women is the fate of the private women's colleges in America. VMI's
potential destruction is a commentary on single-sex education per se.
The VMI case is not an isolated problem, but reflects a movement in
this country toward conformity and sameness. As one of the last pub-
lic single-sex institutions left in the country, VMI symbolically and
legally serves as a last line of defense against those who wish to chal-
lenge gender discrimination at private women's colleges. Moreover,
in the last decade, the Supreme Court has found that the public/pri-
vate distinction may be blurred in the context of higher education.
A. Carry Me Back to Old Virginny: The Separate but
Equal Doctrine
In September 1993, attorneys for VMI submitted a plan to Judge
Kiser's district court in western Virginia with the goal of salvaging
the Institute's all-male heritage. The plan embraces the Fourth Cir-
cuit's suggestion that a "parallel institution" be created for women.
Located only thirty miles from Lexington, officials from Mary Bald-
win College in Staunton, Virginia, a private women's school, have
agreed to harbor a military program designed to simulate the one at
VMI. The program would include a Reserve Officer Training Corps
and other military training offered at VMI, but would exclude the
more extreme military exercises - including the "rat line" and the
"dyke system" of mentors. As further incentive, VMI has agreed to
provide $6.9 million to Mary Baldwin College to cover expenses
involved in the creation and maintenance of the program.5 6
In 1954, almost forty years before the VMI case, the Supreme
Court held in Brown v. Board of Education,'57 that "in the field of
public education the doctrine of separate but equal has no place. Sep-
arate educational facilities are inherently unequal."'' 58 Although Jus-
tice Earl Warren was referring specifically to separation of the races, a
question still exists as to whether this broadly phrased statement
abrogates "separate but equal" public educational settings based on
gender. 5 9
155. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
156. Debbi Wilgoren, Plan for Female VMI Splits Campus, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1993, at
Dl.
157. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
158. Id. at 495.
159. One legal scholar commented on the Fourth Circuit's decision in VMI by saying of the
1476
VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE
Many legal commentators believe the argument advanced in
Brown (that separation is inherently unequal) may be employed in the
context of gender to show that separate men's and women's educa-
tional institutions are also inherently unequal. 16° Their argument is
basically that
.. blacks and women have faced strikingly similar conditions. It
is therefore likely that if, as the Supreme Court found in Brown v.
Board of Education, racial segregation adversely affects the self-
image of black children, sex segregation will have the same effects
on females. Separation in each case conveys a stigma and perpetu-
ates stereotypes. 16 1
As in Brown, this stigma involves the inferiority associated with sepa-
ration and the intangible effects associated with denial of attendance
at a particular school. To some, the term "separate but equal" carries
with it the connotation of exclusion of a disempowered group by a
dominant group.1 62 Those opposed to a "separate but equal" setting
claim to have evidence that the psychological effects on young women
are similar to the badge of inferiority experienced by blacks in separa-
tion by race. 63 In addition, it may be difficult for all-female schools
to replicate the prestige, traditions, reputation of faculty, alumni influ-
ence, and professional contacts of their all-male counterparts. Oppo-
nents of the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of education
have called for abrogation by analogy to race. As one commentator
concluded, "[The doctrine is] as vulnerable today as [it was] twenty
years ago. The grounds for rejecting the racial 'separate but equal'
doctrine are applicable to the sex-based doctrine, particularly in view
of the analogous situations in which blacks and women have found
themselves."'16
The arguments based on analogy to race, however, are misplaced
both as to Brown's legacy and to the respective plights of women and
blacks. First, Brown referred only to de jure or intentional segrega-
tion by race and not to separation by sex. The statistical evidence
used in Brown dealt only with race. Similar evidence has not been
separate but equal language, "I thought we eliminated [that argument] some 30 or 40 years
ago." Harris, supra note 153.
160. See Cynthia Lewis, Plessy Revived: The Separate But Equal Doctrine and Sex-
Segregated Education, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585 (1977); Mollman, supra note 97, at
156; Single-Sex Public Schools: The Last Bastion of "Separate But Equal?", 1977 DUKE L.J.
259 (1977) [hereinafter Single-Sex]; Marcia Berman, Comment, An Equal Protection Analysis
of Public and Private All-Male Military Schools, 1991 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 211 (1991).
161. Dubnoff, supra note 49, at 320.
162. See Mollman, supra note 160, at 156.
163. See Single-Sex, supra note 160, at 276.
164. Lewis, supra note 160, at 648.
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offered by the opponents of the "separate but equal" doctrine in the
context of sex. It is not so clear that women suffer as a result of "sep-
arate but equal" education, and it would be intellectually dishonest to
apply the data of Brown to the situation of women. Furthermore,
after the Brown decision, the Court had an opportunity to extend its
abrogation of the "separate but equal" doctrine to sex. It chose not
to. Both in Vorchheimer and Williams, the Supreme Court affirmed
circuit court decisions which relied on the notion of "separate but
equal" educational opportunities. 63 In Hogan, as well, Justice
O'Connor avoided the opportunity to strike down "separate but
equal." 66
Both historical and situational differences exist between blacks
and women which limit any parallels between the two groups.
167
"[The] history of slavery and invidious discrimination in the areas of
education, public accommodation, and housing, among others, distin-
guishes the experiences of blacks from those of women."1' 6  The
stigma attached to each group by separation is not the same. The
separation between men and women was derived from society placing
women on a "pedestal", not in a "cage," as whites had done to
blacks. 169 Separation of the sexes has its origins in paternalism, not
enslavement. In addition, blacks are truly a minority in the numerical
sense. Protection of such minorities is warranted as a result of the
powerlessness they may experience in the political process. Women,
on the other hand, constitute a slight majority of the electorate.
Perhaps the best expression of why the "separate but equal" doc-
trine is accepted in the context of sex but not in the context of race
has to do with "real differences" between peoples. As Justice Stewart
once explained,
The Constitution is violated when government, state or federal,
invidiously classifies similarly situated people on the basis of the
immutable characteristics with which they were born. Thus, detri-
mental racial classifications by government always violate the Con-
stitution, for the simple reason that, so far as the Constitution is
165. Vorchheimer v. School District, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by an equally
divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977); Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd
mem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
166. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
167. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-
1877 250 (1988) (Foner contends that the Fourteenth Amendment does not even apply to
women. "A Civil War had not been fought over the status of women.").
168. Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1920, 1921 (1992).
169. See Elizabeth C. Yen, Single-Sex Schools and Sex Segregation Within Schools:
Constitutional and Statutory Remedies, 55 CONN. B.J. 387, 388 (1981).
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concerned, people of different races are always similarly situated.
By contrast, while detrimental gender classifications by govern-
ment often violate the Constitution, they do not always do so, for
the reason that there are differences between males and females that
the Constitution necessarily recognizes. 7 °
The real differences between men and women have been the corner-
stone of the "separate but equal" doctrine. While scrutiny of gender-
based classifications must be conducted "free of fixed notions concern-
ing the roles and abilities of males and females,"'' the Supreme
Court has also recognized that the Equal Protection Clause does not
"demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons [or]
'require things which are different in fact ... to be treated in law as
though they were the same.' ,,12 Distinguishing a real difference
from a bias, therefore, becomes the threshold question in the area of
"separate but equal."
As a result, considerable evidence exists that the old doctrine of
"separate but equal" continues its viability in sex relations. Everyday
examples of the "separate but equal" doctrine unchallenged as applied
to gender have one common element-the physiological differences
between men and women. These acceptable differences involve the
reproductive and physical characteristics which distinguish the sexes.
Separate public restrooms are an obvious example. States also main-
tain separate prisons for men and women because of a concern for the
physical welfare of women.'I" Each of these examples is based on the
Court's notion that "the sexes are not similarly situated in certain
circumstances." 74
In the case of VMI, the "separate but equal" option suggested by
the Fourth Circuit is comparable to the current "separate but equal"
system in high school athletics. "Separate but equal" teams remain a
constitutionally permissible alternative to gender integrated teams.' 75
States traditionally have separated males and females in athletics
because of the physical differences between the sexes. The primary
rationale for this segregation has been a concern for safety.' 76 A cer-
170. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
171. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
172. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141,
147 (1940)).
173. See Rosemary Herbert, Note, Women's Prisons: An Equal Protection Evaluation, 94
YALE L.J. 1182 (1985).
174. Michael M, 450 U.S. at 469 (citations omitted).
175. See Polly S. Woods, Comment, Boys Muscling in on Girls'Sports, 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 891
(1992).
176. See O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301 (Stevens, Circuit Justice 1980).
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tain physical danger is involved when females compete in contact
sports, such as football or rugby, where males are the predominant
participants. Based on federal regulation, courts have implemented
an absolute bar against female participation in contact sports.177
Courts, however, have also generally upheld a "separate but equal"
doctrine in non-contact sports, such as swimming or baseball so long
as comparable opportunities exist for both boys and girls.'7 8 But,
where the sport is non-contact and no comparable girls' team is pro-
vided, the courts have prohibited exclusion of girls from the boys'
team. 179
Consistent with these policies, VMI's grounds its position on the
notion that men and women are not similarly situated with respect to
their physiological ability to benefit from VMI's program. The dis-
trict court found that "[g]iven the . . . physiological, psychological
and sociological differences between males and females, it would be
impossible to treat everyone fairly by continuing to treat them the
same if women were admitted to VMI. Equal treatment would neces-
sarily give way to fair treatment, thus undermining egalitarianism."180
This observation is based not on bias or stereotype, but on the testi-
mony of educational experts for both VMI and the United States.
The Justice Department's own expert noted that VMI's policy repre-
sented only "a small [portion] of a very large number of academics,
including many, many, others who have in recent years suggested
there are differences and relatively important differences ... between
men and women, [and] that women learn and have different develop-
mental needs."'' Another Justice Department expert in the case,
Colonel Toffier from West Point, agreed that the physiological differ-
ences raised are "very real and not stereotypes."' 82 He testified that
in West Point's experience, it identified approximately 120 physiologi-
cal differences between men and women which were important to the
177. [W]here a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for
members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the
other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously
been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the
team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport.
45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1992) (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 379 (holding that refusal of school to allow female to try out for boys' basketball
team did not violate Equal Protection Clause where girls' team was provided); Leffel v.
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (holding
no Fourteenth Amendment violation where a school prohibited a girl from swimming on the
boys' swim team where the school provided a separate girls' team).
179. Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1302 (8th Cir. 1973).
180. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1439-40 (W.D. Va. 1991).
181. Brief for Appellee, supra note 106, at 25.
182. Id. at 27.
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development of the school's program. 183
Whether one refers to it as a parallel institution or a "separate
but equal" educational opportunity, if Virginia creates an all-female
version of VMI, VMI should be justified in continuing its exclusion of
women. Since VMI's exclusion of women is based on physiological
differences, rather then bias, and since the Court has been reluctant to
use Brown to abrogate "separate but equal" in gender segregation,
there is no support for the claim that "separate but equal" is improper
in the case of VMI.
B. The Private Women's Colleges
In May 1990, the students of Mills College, a private women's
college in California, staged a strike which closed the school for two
weeks. The strike was prompted by the college trustees' decision to
enroll undergraduate men as a way of ensuring the school's financial
success. The women, arguing that the dynamics of all aspects of cam-
pus life would be altered by admitting men, wore shirts proclaiming
"Better Dead than Co-ed."1"4 After extensive nationwide coverage,
the trustees rescinded their decision and Mills College continued its
female-only admissions policy.
In the same year, attention suddenly turned to a similar situation
at VMI, and many of the issues from the Mills College debate were
revisited. Unlike the Mills case, however, popular sentiment shifted
in opposition of the single-sex program at VMI. This caused promi-
nent newspaper columnist William Raspberry to observe: "I don't
have a lot of trouble deciding what I feel about single-sex ... schools.
My difficulty is in trying to mold my inconsistent opinions into a [sin-
gle] principle."1 85 Raspberry was commenting on why he and many
others were supporting the Mills College students, who fought for
their 138-year-old all-female admissions policy, while opposing the
students at VMI who, at the same time, struggled to keep their 152-
year-old single-sex program in place.
While the sentiments may be inconsistent, the truth may be that
the fate of the two schools are indelibly linked. Another columnist
noted: "If single-sex admissions at VMI falls, it's only a matter of
time until the feminist assault wrecks women's colleges, too. 1 86
183. Id. at 27 n.17.
184. Fields, supra note 125.
185. William Raspberry, How Do You Justify Separate Schools?, WASH. POST, May 25,
1990, at A21.
186. Suzanne Fields, Assault on VMI Could Backfire on Feminists, THE ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Oct. 8, 1992, at A12.
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Although VMI is public and the women's colleges are all private, the
only thing standing between the destruction of one and not the other
is the doctrine of state action employed by the courts in equal protec-
tion cases.
The sole catalyst for the suit against Virginia was the Fourteenth
Amendment, which states: "No State shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."',8 7 The liber-
ties protected by the Equal Protection Clause specifically address
actions taken by a state. Thus, when a private individual or entity
violates a right protected by the Amendment, the issue becomes
whether that individual or entity is acting under color of state law or
on behalf of the state. If the discriminating individual or entity is not
involved with the state, no constitutional violation exists because
neither the state nor any of it representatives has acted in a discrimi-
natory manner. So far, private schools rarely have been found to have
such a relationship with a state.
On the other hand, VMI is a publicly-funded state school. Con-
sequently, there is no doubt as to state action. Mills, Smith, Wellesley
and fifty-three other women's colleges across the country are all
essentially private institutions."' In theory, these schools have wide
discretion in their conduct. Since their private actions are supposedly
far removed from the ambit of state action, these schools may con-
tinue a gender-discriminatory admissions policy.
The safety afforded to Mills College and other women's colleges
by the public/private distinction of the state action doctrine, however,
is somewhat illusory. The Supreme Court, for more than a century,
has yet to define a precise test or single dispositive factor for finding
state action. 18 9 Instead, state action is usually decided by the courts
on an ad-hoc basis. Individuals and entities, at one time considered
private, now find themselves in jeopardy of falling into the public
sphere as a result of very minimal contacts with state government. 90
Since state action is decided case-by-case, the Court takes into
consideration many factors: whether the private entity is engaged in a
public function,' 9' whether a state has encouraged private activi-
187. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
188. Douglass College in New Brunswick, New Jersey is state-funded.
189. See Ronna G. Schneider, State Action-Making Sense Out of Chaos-An Historical
Approach, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 737, 737 (1985); Berman, supra note 160, at 224.
190. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that the
requisite state action existed where private restaurant which discriminated against blacks
leased space from a government parking lot).
191. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.2, at 426 (3d ed. 1986).
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ties, 19 2 whether a private actor is licensed or regulated by a govern-
ment agency, 193 whether there is a symbiotic relationship between the
private entity and the state194 and whether a state is funding the pri-
vate individuals or entities. 195
The uncertainty associated with the scope of state action threat-
ens the status of all private women's colleges. Today, private institu-
tions and their students depend significantly upon state and federal
funding. Private women's schools receive approximately 20 percent
of their operating costs from government entities. 19 6 The Common-
wealth of Virginia provides over $38 million in state financial assist-
ance to benefit five private single-sex colleges for women and one
private single-sex college for men. 197 Furthermore, Virginia, like
most other states, provides loans to students attending private institu-
tions of higher learning through its Tuition Assistance Grant
Program. ' 98
The relationship between private women's colleges and their
state governments is one of inverse proportions. As public funding
increases, the school's ability to separate itself from the state
decreases. The issue then becomes whether the government is directly
subsidizing an entity whose activities would violate the Constitution if
the government itself engaged in the activities. In other words, if Vir-
ginia violates the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against
women through VMI's admissions policy, then it is possible that pri-
vate colleges discriminating against men in the same manner may also
be violating the Constitution if the state subsidies are directly linked
to the discriminatory practices.
As with other areas of the state action doctrine, the courts have
been unpredictable in finding state action in the case of subsidized
private education. The threshold question in these cases has been
whether the state assistance is directly linked to the discriminatory
practice or whether the aid is simply in the form of generalized serv-
ices to all schools. 199 Only the former triggers state action.
In Norwood v. Harrison,2" the Supreme Court struck down a
Mississippi program in which the state purchased and loaned text-
192. Id. § 12.3, at 432.
193. Id. § 12.4, at 437.
194. Id. § 12.4 at 440.
195. Id. § 12.4 at 442-43.
196. Fields, supra note 186, at A12.
197. Brief for Appellee, supra note 106, at 12.
198. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-38.11 (Michie 1985).
199. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 191, at 442-43.
200. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
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books to all private schools including those that discriminated on the
basis of race. While the case dealt primarily with textbooks rather
than financial assistance, the Court found that "[t]extbooks are a
basic educational tool and, like tuition grants, they are provided only
in connection with schools; they are to be distinguished from genera-
lized services the government might provide to schools in common
with others."' 20 1 By 1973, state tuition grants had already become sus-
pect in state action cases.
Almost a decade later, the Court revisited the state action issue
in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn. 20 2 Rendell-Baker involved a privately
owned school for students with behavioral problems. Not only was
the school heavily regulated by public authorities, but between ninety
and ninety-nine percent of its operating budget came from public
funding.20 3 The issue was whether the discharge of certain teachers
without due process involved state action. The Court concluded that
the receipt of public funding did not make the discharge decisions acts
of the state.2 4 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger stated:
The school ... is not fundamentally different from many private
corporations whose business depends primarily on contracts to
build roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the govern-
ment. Acts of such private contractors do not become acts of the
government by reason of their significant or even total engagement
in performing public contracts.20 5
At least one commentator, however, has distinguished the
Rendell-Baker decision. 2 6 This distinction is important to the situa-
tion of private women's colleges. First, Rendell-Baker and other
cases decided by the Burger Court, a Court famous for narrowing the
state action doctrine, were all cases brought under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the employees of private
entities.20 7 The plaintiffs' concerns focused primarily on state inter-
ference with economic and property rights. Neither race nor gender
was a factor.
However, claims brought during the Warren era, when the doc-
trine of state action expanded, were frequently based on the Equal
Protection Clause and involved consumers of the private entity under
201. Id. at 465 (emphasis added).
202. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
203. Id. at 832.
204. Id. at 831.
205. Id. at 841.
206. Schneider, supra note 189, at 782-83.
207. Id. at 739.
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scrutiny.2 °8 Race in these cases was always a factor. A pattern of
affording greater protection to claims under the Equal Protection
Clause developed. Today claims against private women's colleges
would likewise be based on the Equal Protection Clause.
Rendell-Baker can be further distinguished by the identity of the
aggrieved party alleging state action.2°9 Rendell-Baker and its prog-
eny involved claims brought by employees of the private entity. This
is a controlling factor since state funding of the entity was not
intended to benefit private employees. Therefore, no state action was
found since state involvement with the entity and the entity's relations
with its employees were unconnected."' 0
When students or private consumers sue, however, the courts
seem willing to find state action because it is precisely this group that
the state funding is intended to benefit. Therefore, the Court in
Rendell-Baker suggests that if students rather than employees had
sued, the state action issue may have been decided differently.21 2 It
would no longer be a detached personnel decision. -
In Milonas v. Williams,2 1 3 a case decided by the Tenth Circuit
shortly after Rendell-Baker, the state action issue was decided pre-
cisely in this manner. The facts in Milonas were similar to Rendell-
Baker in that the case involved significant state funding of a private
school for students with behavioral problems. However, in Milonas,
former students, rather than employees, brought suit. The court held
that Rendell-Baker did not control the state action issue because
Rendell-Baker "differs from the present case in at least one important
respect. The plaintiffs in the present case are not employees, but stu-
dents ...,4
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that courts do have the
flexibility to find state action in cases involving private colleges. In at
least one prior case, the Supreme Court has already demonstrated its
propensity to characterize private colleges discriminating on the basis
of sex as publicly supported if any of their students receive financial
aid. In Grove City College v. Bell,2 5 the Court held that in sex dis-
crimination suits brought under Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 a private college is subject to Title IX's prohibitions
208. Id. at 741.
209. Id. at 741-42.
210. Id. at 742.
211. Id.
212. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. at 830, 851 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
213. 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
214. Id. at 940.
215. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
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where some of its students received federal tuition grants.216 Grove
City was a private, coeducational, liberal arts college which refused
state or federal financial assistance in an effort to maintain its auton-
omy from federal regulation. Though the school did not violate Title
IX, it did refuse to execute the required assurance of compliance -
essentially a promise not to discriminate in any educational program
receiving federal financial aid.217 Unlike most other challenges to pri-
vate schools, the issue here was not state action, but rather "federal
government action" since the suit was brought under a federal civil
rights statute.218 The Court was called on to decide if Grove City had
sufficient federal subsidies to be subjected to the limitations of Title
Ix.
The Court looked to the congressional intent and the plain lan-
guage of Title IX and found that the statute "encompass[ed] all forms
of federal aid to education, direct or indirect. '219  Since some of
Grove City College's students received Basic Educational Opportu-
nity Grants from the federal government, the Court concluded that
the private college received federal financial assistance and therefore
fell under Title IX regulation. 220
Although the Grove City College decision applied to federal
rather than state action issues, it is of paramount importance in fore-
casting the direction of the state action doctrine in gender discrimina-
tion. It would be unusual for the Court to abandon its Grove City
College reasoning when similar lawsuits brought against private col-
leges rest on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. If the court
can penetrate private schools by holding that federal tuition grants
constitute sufficient federal involvement, then there is nothing to pre-
vent the Court from finding, similarly, that state tuition grants consti-
tute adequate state action.
There is no way to predict whether challenges against private
women's colleges will follow if VMI becomes a coeducational institu-
tion. It is certain, though, that these schools will be more susceptible
to constitutional mandates. This is something even the Fourth Cir-
cuit seemed concerned about when it warned of a "conformity that
216. Id. at 573-74.
217. Id. at 560.
218. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 191, at 422.
219. 465 U.S. at 564 (citing Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 1982))
(emphasis in original) (noting also that, often, the economic effect of direct and indirect
assistance is indistinguishable (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 39.7 n.6 (1983) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)).
220. Id. at 569-70.
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common experience rejects.- 221
IV. CONCLUSION
At the time of the Fourth Circuit's decision, a female supporter
of VMI wrote to the Washington Post to offer a frank assessment of
the situation. She observed:
To me there is little difference between [the desire for women to go
to VMI] and the one that lured me into the men's bathroom in
high school just to see the urinals. So now you've seen them. So
what?... I can see the writing on the wall. If it happens to VMI,
every other single-sex institution is at risk. Someone will want in
just to see what's on the other side, and in the process, so many
choices will be lost.222
Tradition is a poor justification for gender segregation, just as it
is for racial segregation. "The practice's longevity may demonstrate
merely the depth of the prejudice rather than the practice's
legitmacy. ' '1 23 Too often tradition has been a pretext for hate, big-
otry, and stereotyping.
However, there are traditions that even cultural purists might
agree are important to our society. Family, individualism and diver-
sity are all traditions that have earned a healthy respect in our system
of government. A nation that emasculates some of the strongest tra-
ditions might ultimately become a "nation without a cultural iden-
tity." 224 The traditions of single-sex education and educational
diversity are firmly rooted in our history. Unlike other tainted tradi-
tions, single-sex education is neither forced nor denied-it is readily
available to all who willingly choose it, whether male or female. VMI
has been a single-sex institution since its founding 154 years ago. Its
contribution to diversity in Virginia's system of higher education is
unquestionable, as are the contributions of the state's private women's
colleges. In a fire storm of political correctness and liberalism, how-
ever, the tradition of single-sex education at VMI, and perhaps else-
where, now finds itself on the verge of a sacrifice in the name of
conformity.
In its petition to the Supreme Court, VMI wrote that unless its
single-sex status is preserved, "coeducation will be viewed as a consti-
tutional imperative, and educational diversity and experimentation
221. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 897 (4th Cir. 1992).
222. Kathryn Coley, VMI Should Remain All-Male, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1992, at A20.
223. Lewis, supra note 160, at 585.
224. Jere Real, The Last of the Old Corps?, NAT'L REV., Aug. 6, 1990, at 23.
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will be thwarted at a time when it is desperately needed." '225
For 154 years, VMI has provided young men with the experience
of learning in one of the most unique educational environments any-
where under a system uniquely suited to their needs and characteris-
tics. As Justice Stewart once wrote, "the Equal Protection Clause
does not mean that the physiological differences between men and
women must be disregarded .... [Our] Constitution surely does not
require a State to pretend that demonstrable differences between men
and women do not really exist."'226 The Battle of New Market has
taken on a new meaning at the Lexington campus these days. The
guns of battle from an earlier era echo in the hearts of the Institute's
faithful defenders. The cadets once again face seemingly insurmount-
able odds. And, VMI should be allowed to continue marching to the
beat of its own drummer.
BRIAN SCOTT YABLONSKI
225. VMI asks Supreme Court To Decide Constitutionality of Its Single-Sex Admissions
Policy, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
226. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 475, 481 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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